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BETHESDA HEALTHCARE SYSTEMS:
PHYSICIAN INFORMATION SYSTEM
Susan L. Carter
T. Grandon Gill
Florida Atlantic University
U.S.A.
The Bethesda Healthcare Systems: Physician Information System case presents students with the opportunity
to consider information systems from the viewpoint of a major healthcare provider.  Bethesda Healthcare
System (BHS) determined it had a strategic need to improve the communication process between the BHS and
the doctors and among the doctors themselves. In the past few years BHS had begun working toward this goal
by adopting a Physician Information System (PIS).  However, further development on this system had come
to a standstill until a decision could be made on the future direction of the PIS.  To break this paralysis, BHS
needs to make a choice among many alternatives.  This case presents five possible alternatives and addresses
many issues that affect the choice.  Students are asked to help the Corporate VP of Strategy make a
recommendation to BHS on which alternative to select.  In doing this, they are faced with many issues that are
not quantifiable.  Thus the decision is not clear cut and allows the students to see the difficulty in making IT
related decisions.
Kenneth Peltzie, Vice President of Corporate Strategy for the Bethesda Healthcare System (BHS), was deliberating on the
recommendation he would make to BHS's board and other executives.  The decision that they made would have major
implications for the way in which relationships between doctors and the organization were managed electronically. Several years
before, as part of a move toward reducing paperwork, cutting administrative costs, and avoiding unnecessary delays, the Boynton
Beach, Florida-based non-profit BHS, which consisted of Bethesda Memorial Hospital and several satellite facilities, had
implemented the RADIANT system (formerly known as IMS MEDACOM™ Networks). This system, to which doctors could
connect using ordinary phone lines, provided electronic access to many routine types of information, such as patient data, lab
results, and scheduling confirmations. The system had proven to be a qualified success, with most doctors who routinely used
the BHS facilities taking advantage of the system. More important from a cost perspective, nearly all of the largest practices
employed the system. The system had shortcomings, however. To avoid software and hardware conflicts, BHS recommended
doctors keep a PC dedicated to RADIANT in their offices. Also, the degree to which RADIANT interfaced with BHS's other
information systems was limited. While such integration was theoretically possible, it required both considerable expertise in using
the RADIANT scripting language and a high level of understanding of existing BHS systems. Currently, that combination of skills
was hard to find in-house.   Even when the system could be updated, it was hard to communicate the new capabilities of the
system to the user community. Finally, RADIANT's use of older-technology text-based screens and dial-up connections neither
enticed new doctors onto the system nor encouraged existing users to utilize a wider range of the system's capabilities
With less than a year remaining on a five-year license for RADIANT, BHS's decision about physician information systems was
becoming urgent. Peltzie was considering the following options:  (1) the status quo (i.e., staying with RADIANT as currently
employed with probable upgrade to the Windows 95 version), (2) continuing to use RADIANT but outsourcing administration
of the BHS communications center; (3) upgrading to an Internet-based version of Kinetra that was about to be introduced,
(4) switching to VHAseCURE.net™, a competing product that had been developed by the Volunteer Hospitals of America (VHA),
or (5) developing their own home-grown communications system using dynamically-generated web pages that doctors could
access.
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No matter what decision was made on the physician information system, it would ultimately have a major impact on his goal of
transforming BHS into a paperless organization. Thus, the decision on how best to  accomplish electronic integration of doctors'
offices with BHS needed to be made in concert with the organization's overall strategy.
HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
 
Many players make up the healthcare industry: patients, payers (patients, insurance companies, government), and providers
(doctors, hospitals) of health-related services. Prior to the 1980s, patients were viewed as both consumers, of services and
customers buying services.   As consumers when they needed care they went to a provider of their choice.  Insurance companies
then acted in the role of payer, taking care of a prespecified percentage of patient costs.  In the 1970s, a movement toward
“managed care” grew out of a concern for cost containment. Managed care led to new types of health insurance organizations,
including preferred provider organizations (PPOs) and health maintenance organizations (HMOs) where the employers were the
customers.   In addition, the period from the 1960s to the 1990s saw a huge increase in government-sponsored healthcare
programs, primarily Medicare and Medicaid.  While some traditional insurance plans still existed, paying a set percentage of costs
no matter what health-related service providers were used, PPOs and HMOs (and, to a lesser extent, government programs)
provided agreements with specific providers and limited their insured to seeing only those providers. When non-designated
providers were used, companies either refused to reimburse patients or extracted heavy penalties.
With the growth of managed care, the process of supplying health-related services became increasingly complex. Not only did
patients have to utilize designated providers (who typically had contracts with more than one managed care organization), but
they also had to follow plan guidelines with respect to covered services. Some companies, for example, actively promoted
ambulatory care. Ambulatory care took patients out of the in-patient status in the hospitals and put them in outpatient facilities
run by the hospitals or separate organizations.  As a result, procedures formerly done in the hospital now had to be done in non-
hospital settings to qualify for full reimbursement.  Managed care organizations were not only selling insurance, but effectively
controlling the type and quantity of care given.  In some cases, the decision about what constituted appropriate care was taken
totally out of the doctors' hands. For example, the length of a hospital stay for certain medical events (such as childbirth) was set
by the provider, not the doctor.  Not only did this take the decisions away from the doctors, it also caused a public outcry.  As
a result, the government increasingly became involved in the healthcare industry in another role—that of a regulator.
The dynamic nature of the healthcare industry meant that suppliers of healthcare services needed to be extremely adaptable to
survive. They had to be able to customize their billing to the procedures of each different payer. They had to be able to change
rapidly as each payer changed. They had to keep current with new medical technologies and procedures—and the rules governing
the uses of the technologies and procedures, which changed daily. And, of course, they had to do their best to improve the
condition of their patients.
Hospitals
Hospitals are the most complex health service providers. Hospitals are characterized by a complicated organizational structure,
an extensive division of labor, and an elaborate system of coordination of tasks, functions, and social interaction. They are
comprised of many departments such as emergency services, surgical services, imaging services, and maternity services, to name
just a few. Authority in the typical hospital is shared by a triad: the board of trustees, doctors, and administrators. This sharing
typically leads to a delicate balance of power between the factions, which is in turn influenced by other factors, such as hospital
ownership (e.g., profit vs. non-profit, secular vs. church-affiliated, public vs. private, independent vs. part of a chain).
Because hospitals are extremely dependent on the community they serve, there is no such thing as a “standard” hospital
organization. Common to most hospitals, however, is an extensive division of labor. Paradoxically, while many of activities
performed in a hospital are highly departmentalized and specialized, they are nonetheless highly interdependent.  Nearly all of
the activities that affect the well being of a patient interact with each other. To further complicate matters, the hospital has little
control over its workload or over its patients.  The flow of work is variable and irregular, so coordination through mechanical
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standardization—as is done in a typical assembly line—is not possible. As a result, a great need for intercommunication among
task specialties exists.1
One major challenge to management is that hospitals typically have little control over some of their key players—most notably,
doctors. Doctors play a pivotal role since hospitals only provide the services ordered by the doctors. Most doctors, however, are
not employees of the hospital. Instead they have privileges with the hospital, which means they may order services. In effect,
hospitals provide a work place for the doctors and staff who provide the services. In turn, the hospital has several main
responsibilities:  first, to provide the services properly; second, to facilitate the providing of the services; and third, to investigate
and handle matters if a doctor makes a mistake. For example, doctors need to be able to access all available existing data about
a patient in order to make the best decision as to which procedure to order. The hospital has to be in a position to supply such data.
Hospital revenues come primarily from payments from insurance, the government, and patients (although donations may also play
a role in non-profit or church-affiliated hospitals). Rather than being paid based on actual charges for services, today’s hospitals
usually are paid based on diagnosis, average per diem, or a percentage of the charge. Unfortunately, there is virtually no agreement
across different payers regarding what fees are appropriate for a given circumstance.
Information Systems in the Healthcare Industry
Prior to the mid-1970s, the expense and complexity of computer technology made it impractical for all but the largest hospitals
to own their own computers. Most hospitals, therefore, had to rely on paper-based information systems, sometimes supplemented
by terminals supplied by vendors, such as American Hospital Supply Co. During the decade that followed, technology prices and
the advent of PCs and networks led to a rapid automation of hospital core applications (patient accounting, general accounting,
and order entry). By the late 1980s, however, few straightforward automation opportunities remained. Hospitals then turned their
attention to more complex applications, including clinical systems, systems to aid in the care of the patients such as clinical
decision support systems and computer-assisted patient care. Such clinical systems, however, could not work in isolation. Instead,
they needed to be integrated with the existing administrative and financial systems.
An approach used to achieve such integration was the development of Clinical Data Repositories (CDR), a.k.a. Clinical Data
Record. Such CDRs were, effectively, central databases of information that could be accessed by many different systems. One
type of CDR, for example, contained the information, primarily administrative, related to the hospital patient record. By the late
1990s, this type of CDR could display patient-related data, but was limited in its ability to provide comparative data and
manipulate that data. A more ambitious CDR held an interactive medical record. Ultimately, this type of CDR was intended to
fully automate the patient’s medical record, allowing information such as digitized x-rays, EKG readouts, and scanned paper
documents to be attached—although few systems had incorporated all if these capabilities by the late 1990s. In the past, vendors
had developed these two types of systems independent of each other. At the time of the case, however, hospitals were placing
increased pressure on vendors to merge the two types of CDR. At the same time, concerns existed regarding inadequate response
times, lack of physician input into their design, questions of data ownership and security, and the failure of vendors to demonstrate
a fully operational installed system.2
The transition in healthcare information systems usage occurred during a period of turmoil among the suppliers of these systems.
In period between 1995 and 1997, for example, over 1,500 applications became obsolete as a result of vendor acquisitions of
competitive products. In addition, even if a product was not eliminated as a result of a competitive acquisition, the acquiring
company often decided to cut back on new system development—effectively eliminating the product’s long-term viability. As
a result, healthcare enterprises were routinely required to expend resources to acquire replacement systems. Another major change
leading to the replacement of existing systems was the emergence of the Internet and the use of intranets (internal networks that
utilized Internet protocols and software). These communications technologies served to redefine the “healthcare competitive
Carter and Gill
3 Source:   Steve Fink and Gary Gorden, Session 23:   Healthcare and the Internet:  Using Internet Technology to Create Competitive
Advantage, The Healthcare Information and Management Systems Society, 1997.
4 Source:  James G. Anderson, “Clearing the Way for Physicians’ Use of Clinical Information Systems,” Communications of the ACM, August
1997, pp. 83-90.
666
landscape to link healthcare practice, management and automation in a new model of Internet team medicine.”3  The Internet, with
its widespread availability and easy access, made communication among users cheaper and, more importantly, much more
convenient. Regional healthcare organizations in particular found that they no longer had to design and maintain their own wide
area networks to establish communication between members.
A final challenge to implementing healthcare information systems—particularly clinical systems—was long standing in nature:
gaining acceptance by the doctors and other healthcare providers who must use them.  Since the first computer appeared in a
hospital, resistance from users had been commonplace. In some cases such resistance stemmed from general discomfort with
information technology. More often, however, it was a result of new systems requiring that changes be made in “the ways they
[doctors] have traditionally recorded, retrieved, and utilized clinical data.”4  Because of the complex managerial relationships in
hospitals and healthcare enterprises, it was nearly impossible to force doctors to accept a new system. Only substantial benefits
(to the doctor) from using the system, coupled with widespread acceptance by peers, could serve to motivate doctors to make the
required change.
BETHESDA HEALTHCARE SYSTEM
Bethesda Healthcare System was located in Boynton Beach on the Gold Coast of Florida, a region of rapid growth. Because of
this rapid growth, and because of a large retired population with an above-average requirement for medical services, the need for
medical care in the region had grown dramatically since the 1960s, with no end to growth in sight. Where once a few isolated
hospitals existed, many hospital groups were established, the majority of which offered services at more than one physical
location.
Background
In 1959, Bethesda Memorial Hospital opened its doors and began serving the Southeastern Palm Beach County Hospital District
as a tax-assisted entity. To enhance its competitive posture, in the mid-1980s the hospital was restructured as a private, not-for-
profit corporation known as Bethesda Healthcare System (BHS). This new corporation managed all of Bethesda’s services. Over
the years, to keep up with the needs of the community, Bethesda Healthcare System grew and, by the late 1990s, included
Bethesda Memorial Hospital, Bethesda Health City, Bethesda Women’s Health Center, and Bethesda Professional Plaza. These
facilities were in multiple locations throughout the city of Boynton Beach, Florida.
Bethesda Memorial Hospital (BMH) was a fully accredited private community-based hospital offering a full array of healthcare
services. More than 400 physicians, representing over 30 areas of specialty, were affiliated with the hospital. One of a number
of satellite facilities, Bethesda Health City offered “the convenience of a mall setting with family doctors, specialists, and
healthcare professionals working together in one location” according to the hospital’s web page. It offered a variety of services
under one roof so patients did not have to travel from place to place. Bethesda Women’s Health Center specialized in treating the
physical, emotional and social aspects of healthcare for women of all ages. Bethesda Fitness Center, in addition to being a gym,
provided physical therapy and assisted patients with recovery and rehabilitation.  Bethesda Professional Plaza was an office
complex primarily intended to house medical professionals in a variety of specialties.  (See Exhibit 1 for a list of services.)
Exhibits 2 presents the organization charts for BHS.
 
BHS was a member of the Voluntary Hospitals of America (VHA), a nationwide network of community-owned healthcare
organizations and physicians. Among the functions the VHA performs for its members are consolidated purchasing and
information transfer, allowing smaller community hospitals to mimic the buying power of their larger urban cousins.
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IS Department
The 36 IS employees at BHS were divided into three groups, with about equal numbers in each.  Its Technical Services group was
responsible for PC support, all hardware and software maintenance throughout the facility, and network and database
administration.  The Operations group kept the mainframe running 24 hours a day, seven  days a week.  The third group, the
Analysts, developed the applications, built screens, and generally supported the customers with application problems. Applications
included but were not limited to financial, administrative, and clinical systems. BHS customized SMS-supplied software to meet
its clinical needs.  Among the modules used by BHS were On-line Patient Care Documentation (PCD), Order Processing, and
Lifetime Clinical Record (LCR).   The nurses used PCD for charting the plan of care for a patient, assessments of the patient, and
the patient’s vital signs.  The Order Processing system was used by the unit clerks and the nurses to enter doctors’ orders, which
were then sent to the ancillary departments (such as Radiology).  Once the orders were carried out, the results were put back into
the system.
One major challenge that BHS faced was making the Lifetime Clinical Record (LCR) electronically accessible to the doctors.
At present, the physicians had to print out anything they wanted.  IS wanted to provide better access for the physicians, primarily
through the development of the Physician’s View.  The Physician’s View would be the doctors’ equivalent to the nurses’ PCD.
Eventually, the Physician’s View would provide the physicians with the ability to place orders, look up results of tests on-line,
etc.  BMS’s Information System’s director, Leslie Durham, stated that one major goal was to make these systems interdisciplinary.
At present, many departments such as physical therapy, respiratory therapy, and occupational therapy were not tied into the
system.  These enhancements were to be phased in.
RADIANT SYSTEM
For many years, BHS under Peltzie’s guidance had been attempting to eliminate paperwork in the hospital. In the past, voluminous
paperwork, such as transcripts of physicians’ dictated notes, lab, pathology, and radiology reports, would be printed out and put
in the doctor’s mailbox in the doctors’ lounge.  The result was a system fraught with waste, both for BHS—who had to generate
the paperwork—and for doctors, who had to sort through it.
In 1994, BHS instituted a computer system intended to eliminate much of this paperwork and make the communication process
between BHS and the doctors’ offices easier. It contracted to use the IMS MEDACOM Networks system (which became known
as RADIANT), to serve as a communication system between itself and the doctors’ offices. The two-way network linked
healthcare services with physicians, and physicians with other physicians, allowing the exchange of messages. The system
permitted both computer-to-computer and computer-to-fax message exchanges.  Computers and modems were installed in
approximately 200 physicians’ offices with a few more communicating through fax machines. While BHS dealt with
approximately 400 physicians, the 200 physicians using RADIANT represented the majority of the hospital’s revenue generators.
Additionally, they were the main recipients of reports. The remaining doctors still picked up their reports from their mailboxes.
Interestingly, the IS department was not responsible for the RADIANT system.  Instead, that responsibility fell on the Marketing
department.
In total, the acceptance of the RADIANT system at BHS had been good and was growing. For example, in January 1996, 13,608
messages were passed through RADIANT in BHS. By February 1998, the monthly volume of messages had grown to 47,522 (see
Exhibit 3). The types of information conveyed in these messages varied widely. Some might be routine (e.g., discharge notices,
transcribed reports) whereas others might be time critical (e.g., radiology and other test results). Exhibit 4 contains a sample
message listing.
Functionally, RADIANT served as far more than a simple e-mail system. At the heart of the system was the ComCenter™, which
redirected mail traffic, much of which was computer generated. For example, reports were sent by computer to the ComCenter
and were then sent, without human intervention, to the appropriate doctor’s office. The ComCenter also acted as the intermediary
between various relays, which served as automated message routers, and the doctors’ offices—verifying the addressee of the
message and then forwarding it on.  The entire messaging process was highly automated. Once a doctor had become part of the
system, reports were sent to them automatically.  In addition, since all report traffic was routed through the ComCenter, no two
PCs ever had to be directly connected. 
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Beyond the delivery of reports, data could be transmitted to the doctors as it was being generated.  For example, the fetal heart
monitors could be linked so that the fetal heart strips were sent to the doctors’ offices in real-time.  Additionally, RADIANT was
routinely used to support centralized scheduling of outpatient appointments.
Internally, the RADIANT system had little built-in medical functionality or built-in connectivity to other medical systems. What
it offered instead was a scripting language that allowed developers to create forms for user requests, reports to display information,
and requests used for exchanging information with other connected systems. The availability of a scripting language permitted
the system to be customized to the needs of the various users, with each department (potentially) developing its own scripts to
serve its specific needs.  Although BHS had many scripts in place, the number of application scripts that could be developed in
the future was huge. One factor inhibiting such development was the knowledge that if RADIANT was replaced by another
system, all scripts would probably have to be completely rewritten for the new system.
In acquiring RADIANT, BHS elected to purchase the ComCenter license and, as a result, was responsible for all installation and
maintenance of the system at both BHS and the physicians’ offices. BHS used the DOS version of RADIANT, electing not to
upgrade to the Windows 95 version for several reasons. First, many doctors’ offices did not have the up-to-date computer
hardware required to run Windows 95. Second, BHS has had frequent technical problems getting the relays to work with their
mainframes. Such problems provided users who were not enamored with the system an excuse to complain, and it was felt that
the disruption caused by a system-wide upgrade would only add to the problem. Finally, because BHS was nearing a decision
point regarding whether or not to change physician information systems, it did not make sense to further upgrade RADIANT
before that decision had been made.
The uncertainty regarding its future use was just one factor preventing RADIANT from being used to its full potential.
RADIANT’s under-utilization at BHS was also due to the complete lack of connections between some departments and
RADIANT. Thus, scripts were unavailable to a large number of users who could have applied them. Even users having access
to the system were not necessarily using it to its full potential. Indeed, Peltzie felt that both internal personnel and doctors
underused the system since they did not always recognize that delivering information was part of their mission. Individual
departments had always operated independently of each other, and were therefore not really concerned with the needs of other
departments.  
Peltzie was also concerned that doctors did not always recognize that easily accessible data can be key to a successful medical
practice. Instead, Angela Scites, the RADIANT coordinator, and others who had conducted field installations had frequently found
both the doctors and their staff resistant to the changes that using the system effectively required. Since keeping the office staff
content can be extremely important to a well-functioning office, doctors were often reluctant to initiate changes that disrupted
well-established office routines. Many office managers, in turn, found reasons to be uncomfortable with the new system. Some
were simply unhappy with any new technology. Others seemed to be afraid that that the system would take over their jobs or cause
them more work. Furthermore, such fears were not entirely unfounded. For example, when BHS switched from leaving the reports
in the doctors’ mailboxes in the hospital lounge to sending them electronically to the doctors’ computers, it shifted the
responsibility for handling the reports from the doctors to the staff.  Another problem was that some offices still had antiquated
systems and had no interest in updating them or in acquiring a new system—even though BHS provided the computers needed.
PHYSICIAN INFORMATION SYSTEM: THE NEXT GENERATION
Since BHS had entered into its five year RADIANT agreement, the company had been renamed Kinetra and had become jointly
owned by EDS and Eli Lilly & Company. With the existing agreement about to expire before the end of 1999, and many
development projects being held up until the future of BHS’s physician information system was clear, Peltzie recognized that a
decision had to be made soon. He perceived that there were a number of paths that BHS could follow.
Alternatives
Six possible alternatives had been uncovered during BHS’s initial attempts to identify possible solutions to the physician
information system problem. These were:
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Status Quo:  BHS could renegotiate the contract with Kinetra, possibly upgrading to the Windows-based version. A number of
factors made this alternative attractive. First, with Kinetra being jointly owned by EDS and Eli Lilly & Company, the product had
the financial backing of two large companies.  In addition, EDS had extensive experience with electronic commerce solutions
for a wide range of healthcare organizations. 
Status Quo, but Outsource:  Even if the status quo option were selected, there were two possible choices to consider. Currently,
BHS took responsibility for all ComCenter functions, meaning that BHS performed all installations and all maintenance, both
in-house and at physician sites.  Another possibility was for the ComCenter to be outsourced.  
Major System Upgrade:  A third alternative under consideration was the acquisition of a major new system that was about to be
introduced by their current vendor. In February 1998, Kinetra announced its new product Odysent™, an adaptation of its medical
communication networking capabilities for the Internet browser-based system. The Kinetra web page describing the system stated
that “registered and authenticated users will be able to view clinical and administrative reports, save these reports into an archive
database, and subsequently retrieve these reports based on user defined search criteria.”  In addition, the system was reported to
provide access to MedCite, a compilation of medical research.
 
VHAseCURE.net:  The Voluntary Hospitals of America Inc. (VHA) was an alliance of more than 1,600 member organizations.
In the mid-1990s, it had created an IT Solutions (ITS) department, which subsequently showed rapid growth. The mission of the
ITS department was two-fold: to assess and endorse vendors’ healthcare applications and to co-market approved products to
members at a substantial discount. In August 1997, the ITS department had launched VHAseCURE.net, a private network that
linked intranets of separate organizations together in order to provide a secure electronic environment for conducting business.
The network was often used to do medical research and consulting and allowed clinical data and other confidential information
to be exchanged on its secure channel. It had also announced that it would soon be able to supply such results to physician offices,
although such capabilities were not currently available.5
As an active and enthusiastic member of the VHA, BHS had already committed to use VHAseCURE.net to provide compilations
of medical information, such as articles, books, etc., in an easy to use format. Given it would already be in use at BHS, the
question then became whether or not VHAseCURE.net should be adopted to handle the communications with doctors as well.
 
Internet and BHS-created Web Pages:  A fourth alternative potentially available to BHS would be to develop its own in-house
system using the Internet as its communication channel. Doctors could be given user names and passwords to get them into the
system. Information could then be delivered to doctors in the form of computer generated web pages containing relevant results.
Investigate Other Alternatives:  A final possibility available to BHS would be to extend the current contract for a limited period,
thereby allowing further alternatives to be considered. While postponing the decision seemed initially attractive, Peltzie felt that
the uncertainty regarding the future of the system had already done much to hamper new development and was, therefore, loath
to extend the duration of that uncertainty.
Evaluation Criteria
In deciding among the available alternatives, Peltzie recognized that pure financial criteria would have to take a back seat. Few
of the benefits of such a system were tangible and easily quantified.   The primary benefits were more often qualitative than
quantitative. For example, how did you put a dollar value on delivering better information faster to the doctors?  Although some
hospital administrators had attempted to use ROI to measure the value of IT, such attempts had fallen out of favor with top
executives of healthcare organizations. Indeed, according to a recent survey by Coopers & Lybrand and Zinn Enterprises, 72%
of recent IS expenditures were justified based on supporting the strategic initiative while only 8% were justified based on ROI.6
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Instead, BHS began to establish a set of criteria against which the different physician information system alternatives could be
measured. These criteria are listed in Exhibit 5. A summary of the five major options across each of these criteria is provided in
Exhibit 6.
THE HOSPITAL OF THE FUTURE
While the current contract would not expire until a year and a half from now, the physician information system decision needs
to be made soon. There is a significant cost in putting off the decision:  paralysis.  Already further development on the RADIANT
project has, for all intents and purposes, been put on hold until BHS knows if it will continue with RADIANT or not.  As a
consequence, BHS was not taking advantage of the ability to improve its workflow and its communication processes.  In making
the decision, Peltzie recognized that it would be dangerous to focus too narrowly on the specifics of each individual option and
only on today’s demands.  Ultimately, the system would become just one component in a completely electronic hospital: a hospital
where printouts, film, and blinking equipment displays were all captured directly into the central information system, analyzed,
and then disseminated to the appropriate individuals. The ability to communicate with doctors was obviously going to be central
to such a system, but would be only one component of it. Unfortunately, many of the other components had not yet been built—or
even imagined, in some cases. Peltzie sensed that if they got the physician information system decision “right” now, they would
save themselves a lot of headaches in the future. But, for the present, he faced the challenge of selling his recommendation to the
BHS board and other executives. And then, the even more daunting challenge of selling it to the doctors…
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Bethesda Memorial Hospital
Comprehensive Cancer Care
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Rehabilitative Services
Emergency Services
Bethesda Home Care Network
Maternity Center
Neonatal Intensive Care Unit (NICU)
Pediatrics
Genetic Counseling Services
Department of Psychiatric Services
Center for Advanced Imaging
Same Day Surgical Services
Transitional Care Unit
Hyberbaric Medicine
Physician Referral Service
Bethesda Health City
Family Health Center
Walk-in Care Center
Pediatric Care Center
Women’s Health Center
Medical/Surgical Specialists Center
Same Day Surgery
Laboratory/Radiology
Healthy “U” Education Center
Comprehensive Rehabilitation
Comprehensive Optical Services
Oral and Maxillofacial Surgery
Hearing and Speech Services
VICE PRESIDENT
CORPORATE STRATEGY
BHS
BOARD OF  TRUSTIES
INTERNAL AUDITOR BMSBOARD OF  TRUSTIES
PRESIDENT
BHS/BMH
VICE PRESIDENT
INTEGRATED CARE
VICE PRESIDENT
 HUMAN RESOURCES
VICE PRESIDENT
 RISK MANAGEMENT
VICE PRESIDENT
INFORMATION SYSTEMS
MARKETING
PLANNING
PUBLIC RELATIONS
SALES
BETHESDA
MEDICAL  ASSOCIATES
BETHESDA
HEALTH CITY
PERSONNEL
ADMINISTRATION
SECURITY I.S. CONSULTING
INFORMATION
SYSTEMS
COMMUNICATIONS
ADMINISTRATIVE
SERVICES
CENTRALIZED
SCHEDULING
Approval
DOCTORS
ANSWERING SERVICE
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EXECUTIVE VICE PRESIDENT
BHS/BMH
BETHESDA MEMORIAL
HOSPITAL)
VICE PRESIDENT
PATIENT SERVICES
VICE PRESIDENT
OPERATIONS
PRACTICE DEVELOPMENT
PHYSICIAN
SUPPORT SERVICES
MANAGED CARE
EMPLOYMED
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Exhibit 3
BHS Medacom Network
Monthly Message Volume
Carter and Gill
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Exhibit 4
DAILY SUMMARY REPORT Fri Mar 06  09:20:20  1998
THIS REPORT REFLECTS INFORMATION GATHERED DURING Feb 1998
NOT LISTING ANY ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
NOT LISTING ANY MAINTENANCE MESSAGES
Date Description Count Size Average
Sun Feb 01 HIM Transcribed Report
Lab Interim I/P
Lab Daily Summary I/P
20 Day Cum I/P
Partial O/P
Final O/P
Admit Form
Transfer Notice
Discharge Notice
Radiology Result
Revised Admit Form
Pathology Result
General Message
Total
88
1
21
1
6
15
31
36
43
336
192
23
12
805
483433
2291
139165
45629
20104
47426
135192
62362
53780
806837
889248
78087
12551
2776105
5493
2291
6621
45629
3350
3161
4361
1732
1250
2401
4631
3395
1045
3448
Mon Feb 02 HIM Transcribed Report
HIM Cardiac Cath
Lab Daily Summary I/P
Partial O/P
Final O/P
Admit Form
Transfer Notice
Discharge Notice
Radiology Result
Revised Admit Form
Pathology Result
Results/Reports Request-
Release of Medial Info
Comprehensive Order Form
O.R. Scheduling Request
Unknown type ‘A41’
Broadcast Message
General Message
Relay Status Report
Total
170
1
18
14
69
102
44
62
567
326
48
1
1
35
3
3
6
23
22
1515
902751
3607
122341
43164
217238
510856
76448
77062
1534023
1524976
195812
1445
1486
45749
4151
3585
13521
29731
149330
5457266
5310
3607
6796
3083
3148
5008
1737
1242
2705
4677
4078
1445
1486
1307
1383
1195
2253
1292
6787
3602
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Exhibit 5
Criteria for Judging Systems
• Compatibility with the existing physician information system:  To what extent could code (e.g., scripts) from the existing
RADIANT system be adapted for use in the new system? If it could not be used directly, how much effort would the
conversion take?
• Compatibility with other BHS applications:  BHS has many systems already in use. To accomplish complete electronic
integration, it would need to integrate the chosen system with the existing systems. Because the existing RADIANT scripts
supported only a small fraction of potential uses for a physician information system, compatibility with the other BHS
applications might be even more important than compatibility with the existing system.
• Adaptability:  In the dynamic healthcare industry, it was critical that the system be flexible in the tasks it performed and
adaptable to changes in the business environment.
• Vendor stability:  To what extent was the vendor reliable and financially stable? Was there a danger that the product could
be discontinued through acquisition, like so many other medical information system products?
• Support:  What level of technical support and training did the vendor offer, with respect to both initial installation and
ongoing requirements, such as updates and new installations?
• Selling points:  For the new system to succeed, acceptance by both hospital staff and doctors is crucial. What features are
offered that make it attractive to both doctors and hospital employees?
• Cost:  What would be the initial cost of purchasing and installing the system? What ongoing costs would be incurred in
keeping the system operational and up-to-date?
• Personnel:  What type of personnel would be required to develop, install and operate the system? To what extent are the
people with the needed computer skills already available in-house? How hard will it be to find and hire people with the
skills that are missing in-house?
• Security:  Much of the data in a hospital environment is of a sensitive, personal nature that patients do not want disclosed
except to a select group of providers or insurers.  To what extent could the integrity, privacy, and ethical use of the data
contained in the system be guaranteed?
Exhibit 6
Evaluation Chart
Status Quo—with possible
upgrade to Windows
version In-house
Status Quo—with possible
upgrade to Windows
version Outsource 
Major System Upgrade—
Odysent
VHAseCURE.net Internet and BHS-created Web
pages
Compatibility with
existing physician IS
High High Designed to be comple-
mentary to RADIANT, so if
doctors are using RADIANT
they can also use Odysent
Low Low. Need to rethink
everything.  However, scripts
can become specifications
Compatibility with
other BHS systems
Best. Result of scripts
created; scripts are the
tools to get into the other
systems
Good. Result of scripts
created; scripts are the
tools to get into the other
systems
Medium. Some compatibility
will come from scripts but
they'll have to recreated to fit
the new system
Low. Will likely require
considerable rewrite as
different scripting
language likely to be
required.
Worst. Everything will have to
be figured out anew
Adaptability 
(Low 1
High 5)
 1 1 3 3 5
Vendor Stability High. Both EDS and Lilly
have been around
EDS has extensive
experience with EC
solutions
Existing connectivity
with physicians,
pharmacies, hospitals is
vast
High. Both EDS and Lilly
have been around
High. Both EDS and Lilly
have been around for a long
time.  EDS has extensive
experience with EC
solutions.
Medium. While VHA is
stable, don't know VHA's
level of commitment to
networking product.
N/A.  Can rely primarily on
off-the-shelf technologies that
are basically stable
Not dependent on one
particular vendor
Support High.  Can access EDS's
regional technical support
infrastructure; though it is
possible that support will
be discontinued in the
future for DOS-based
product
High.  Can access EDS's
regional technical support
infrastructure; though it is
possible that support will
be discontinued in the
future for DOS-based
product
High. Will be accessing
EDS's regional technical
support infrastructure
Unknown Virtually none
Status Quo—with possible
upgrade to Windows
version In-house
Status Quo—with possible
upgrade to Windows
version  Outsource 
Major System Upgrade—
Odysent
VHAseCURE.net Internet and BHS-created Web
pages
Selling Points Can use existing scripts si
minimal upfront
development is necessary.
People already know how
to use it.
Reduce activities that
BHS has to perform such
as installations, script
writing
Internet based
Browser-based interface
becoming increasingly
familiar to doctors
Accessible from physicians'
homes
Provides access to MedCite
Standards-based approach
    TCP-IP for connectivity
     SSL2.0 for encryption
Internet based
Browser-based interface
becoming increasingly
familiar to doctors
Accessible from
physicians' homes
Provides access to
compilations of medical
information
Internet based
Browser-based interface
becoming increasingly familiar
to doctors
Estimated Cost
Ranking ( Lowest 1
to Highest 5)
1 2 3 4 5
Personnel Fewer new hires.
Requires technologically
and doctor friendly
people to keep system
running and doctors
happy, but many of the
necessary people are
already employed at BHS
Fewer employees within
BHS dedicated to system. 
Outsourcing may reduce
number personnel needed 
to keep the system
operational
More hires.  BHS does not
currently have employees
with adequate training.
However, many of the
existing employees could be
retrained with minimum
effort.
Requires technologically and
doctor friendly people to
keep system running and
doctors happy
Higher need for new
employees or extensive
training of existing
employees. 
Probably somewhat
tailored to hospital
environment.
Many new people needed. 
Need to hire programmers or
consultants who are currently
in high demand and short
supply
Status Quo—with possible
upgrade to Windows
version In-house
Status Quo—with possible
upgrade to Windows
version Outsource 
Major System Upgrade—
Odysent
VHAseCURE.net Internet and BHS-created Web
pages
Drawbacks Technologically
antiquated system on
DOS and technologically
limiting system on
Windows 95
Lack of Internet
connectivity
Reliance on dedicated
PCs in doctors' offices
Potentially distance BHS
from its key customer
base (doctors)
Not released yet (6/3/98)
Odysent is a new product and
often new releases come with
a number of bugs
A buggy system may alienate
the users
Will require doctors whose
hardware is not WWW
compatible to update the 
hardware
Capabilities provided by
RADIANT were not yet
available, but should be
soon
VHA's objectivity to
choose software to support
its various members
It is an unknown system -
not really sure what they
would be getting - a PIS or
an infrastructure for
delivering one
Requires extensive
programming
Security High. Proprietary
network
Medium. Proprietary
network but outside
company is maintaining it
High. 
Register and Authenticate
users
Limits users to various
functions and access
privileges
Unknown as of yet Variable, will depend on what
is built into the system
